Stay agreement did not effectively waive right to jury trial

Washburn student intern Adam King and I won in State v. Stamps, No. 113,510 (Kan. App. July 15, 2016)(unpublished), obtaining a new trial in a Johnson County nonsupport prosecution. In November 2008, after being charged with criminal nonsupport, Mr. Stamps had entered into a stay agreement to work on paying the back child support, which included a stipulation of facts in the probable cause affidavit and a provision that "the defendant, after consultation with counsel, waives trial by jury." 

Several years later, the district court revoked the stay agreement finding that Mr. Stamps had failed to comply with its terms. After revocation of the agreement, the district court proceeded to convict Mr. Stamps after a bench trial on stipulated facts. The district court imposed a 6-month prison sentence and granted probation.

On appeal, Mr. Stamps argued that the district court had failed to obtain a valid jury trial waiver on the record. The COA applied KSC precedent (blogged about here) and agreed:

Where a jury trial waiver is in writing, Kansas caselaw "requires that the written waiver be after the defendant is 'advised by the court of his right to a jury trial.'" The mere form of a jury trial waiver alone does not ensure a court fully considered the facts and circumstances surrounding a defendant's waiver of his or her jury trial right, which is necessary in deciding whether a knowing and voluntary waiver occurred. There is nothing in the record here indicating that the district court made any attempt to advise Stamps of the nature and extent of his constitutional right to a jury trial prior to Stamps signing the stay agreement. 

The State also points to language in the stay agreement that Stamps "waives any constitutional right to confront the witnesses or evidence as a part of this stipulation of facts" and "agrees that the matter of determining guilt based upon these [sic] stipulated set of facts is to be considered by the court without any further evidence being presented or argument being made by either party." But the general waiver language does not indicate the court advised Stamps about the nature of his right to a trial by jury as opposed to a trial to the court. See [State v. Frye, 294 Kan. 364, 373, 277 P.3d 1091 (2012)] ("Pointedly, the document does not even hint that Frye may actually know what his 'right to a Jury Trial' may be or understand what it means to 'try the case to the Court.'"). Without such an understanding, the jury trial waiver cannot be voluntary and knowing.

In this case, the district court did not address Stamps at all regarding his right to a trial by jury at the hearing on the stay agreement, and the court only briefly addressed Stamps' attorney.

Because the jury trial waiver was not valid, the COA reversed the bench trial conviction and remanded for a new trial. 

[Update: the state filed a PR on August 15, 2016.]

[Further update: the KSC denied the state's PR and the COA mandate issued on February 24, 2017.]