Saturday, February 24, 2018

April 2018 Special KSC Docket (Colby)

Here is the criminal case on the KSC docket for April 9, 2018, held in Colby, Kansas. This is a special evening setting of the KSC at Colby High School.

These summaries are based on the issues listed in the briefs filed and may not very accurately or fully describe the actual issues in the cases. I recommend you review the briefs yourself if you would like more details. Don't forget, arguments are streamed live over the internet at the appellate court website and archived (here) if you would like to listen in to any of these arguments.

[Update: here are some photos from the traveling docket.]

April 9,--Monday--p.m.

State v. Daniel Barlett, No. 112,573 (Wyandotte)
Direct appeal (petition for review); Criminal discharge of a firearm into a vehicle
Samuel Schirer
[Affirmed; Rosen; June 8, 2018]
  • Failure to give self-defense instruction
  • Improper mere association instruction
  • Failure to define intentional conduct
  • Failure to grant mistrial when apparatus for replay of evidence malfunctioned

Friday, February 02, 2018

Due Process violated if no procedure for offender to show he could not pay registration fee

Ryan Eddinger won in State v. Frederick Owens, No. 116,979 (Kan. App. January 12, 2018), obtaining reversal of a Wyandotte County failure to register conviction. The case involved the requirement for sex offenders to pay a $20 registration fee each time they register (four times a year) and making it a crime to fail to pay that fee. Mr. Owens argued that conviction upon failure to pay the fee, when there is no avenue for getting a finding of indigency that would excuse the failure violated the Due Process Clause as it applied to him. The COA agreed that the record showed Mr. Owens' indigency:

Owens claims he wasn't able to pay the registration fee in January, April, and July 2014 because he had been injured, couldn't work for medical reasons, and also had to make child-support payments. The State responds that Owens could have "request[ed] a court to find that he [was] indigent." The State has not argued on appeal that Owens was not actually indigent or that he was able to pay the fee. 

Some evidence was presented at a preliminary hearing on Owens' interactions with the sheriff's office. Owens said he told personnel there that he couldn't afford the fee and that no one told him he could seek an indigency determination from the court. An officer who interacted with Owens, Lisa Williams, testified that she told Owens to "talk to an attorney" about getting a waiver, though she conceded that folks seeking an indigency determination weren't likely to be able to afford an attorney.

So what could Owens have done? It's not clear, even to us, that he had any way to get a court determination of indigency that would have eliminated his criminal responsibility. And that doesn't meet minimal standards for due process. 

The COA clarified that the statute simply did not provide any path to relief for someone in Mr. Owens' shoes:

The problem is that the statute didn't provide any procedure for Owens to seek that court determination. What should Owens have filed? Would the clerk have accepted it and sent it on to a judge for review? Would the judge have considered it a valid proceeding and gone on to make an indigency determination? We can't be at all sure of the answer to any of those questions, and the statute says nothing about them. Even if we assume that there is some implied grant of jurisdiction to the district court to handle some sort of miscellaneous action to make this determination, given the uncertainties and lack of direction, this can't be sufficient process to meet constitutional requirements when a person's liberty is at stake.

In sum, no one gave Owens notice of a procedure he could use to get a court to determine he was unable to pay the $20 before his registration dates. Nor has the Legislature provided any clear guidance about how one might do so. We conclude that Owens' right to procedural due process was violated.

The COA clarified that this decision was particular to Mr. Owens and that other factual scenarios might come out differently. But because the convictions in Mr. Owens' case violated the Due Process Clause, the COA reversed.

[Update: the state did not file a PR and the mandate issued on February 20, 2018.]

Clarifying forgery and making a false information

Randall L. Hodgkinson and Washburn student intern Allie Prester won in State v. Christopher Ward, No. 111,640 (Kan. January 12, 2018), obtaining reversal of Johnson County theft and making a false information convictions. The COA had reversed the convictions, which stemmed from construction partnership finances. The state alleged that Mr. Ward added his name as payee to a check made out to the partnership and cashed it, unknown to his partner. The state charged Mr. Ward with theft by deception, naming the partnership or the bank as the entity deceived, and making a false information based on allegations that the check falsely stated some material matter. The KSC agreed that the evidence was insufficient, albeit for slightly different reasons than the COA.

With regard to the theft by deception conviction, the Court agreed that there was no evidence that the persons charged as victims were deceived:

We agree with the Court of Appeals that the State presented insufficient evidence on deception of and reliance by ACG. ACG qualified as an owner because it had an interest in the $20,000 based on its status as the intended payee of Sweeney's check, and Ward was acting as an agent of ACG when he accepted the check from Sweeney. But "ACG was not deceived by Ward's alteration of Sweeney's check as it neither had the opportunity to inspect nor to be fooled by the altered check." Instead, from the time the check was given to Ward until he deposited it in his personal account at First National Bank, he remained the only person affiliated with ACG who knew of the check's existence or of its original or altered state. In vintage cinema parlance, Ward pulled "an inside job," an embezzlement of company funds. See K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 21-5801(a)(1). His insider status put him in position to take possession of ACG's check, alter its payee line, and then exert unauthorized control over it by depositing it into his personal account—while everyone else at the company remained none the wiser. In essence, Ward stepped out of his role as loyal company agent and into a role acting as himself for only himself. He could not deceive himself. 

We also agree with the Court of Appeals that the State presented insufficient evidence on deception of and reliance by Bank of America, although we do not rely on its rationale that Bank of America cashed the check presented by First National Bank in reliance on Uniform Commercial Code transfer warranties. Rather, the evidence as to theft by deception from Bank of America fails as a matter of law because Ward did not deceive that bank. Ward presented the check to his own bank, First National, and, as one of the bank's representatives testified, it would not have allowed Ward to deposit the check in his personal account but for his addition of "or Chris Ward" to the payee line. Bank of America then honored the check when it was presented by First National Bank because Bank of America's depositor, Sweeney, had signed it. The signature line was the line on the check upon which Bank of America relied, not the altered payee line. While First National Bank undoubtedly was deceived by Ward's actions, Bank of America was not. 

With regard to the making a false writing claim, the KSC analyzed its previous case law and myriad COA cases related to the relationship between the crime of making a false information and forgery.  The KSC overruled its previous caselaw that held that making a false writing should be "related to the defendant's own business or affairs." But the KSC went on to hold that making a false writing requires the defendant to "make" a record and that the record did not support a finding that Mr. Ward made the check at issue in this case:

to convict of making false information in this case, the State must have proved that: (1) Ward knowingly made a written instrument; (2) Ward knew the instrument to be false; (3) Ward had the intent to defraud; and (4) Ward obstructed the detection of a theft or felony or induced official action. 

The Legislature has not defined the term "make" in this context. See K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 21-5111 (definitions). But plain words should be given their ordinary meaning, and dictionary definitions can be good sources for such meanings. Black's Law Dictionary defines "make" as "1. To cause (something) to exist . 2. To enact (something) . 3. To acquire (something) . 4. To legally perform, as by executing, signing, or delivering (a document) ." The evidence in this case showed only that Ward altered a check already filled out in full by Sweeney. He did not "make" the check in any of the senses recognized in Black's.

In addition, the Uniform Commercial Code, which Kanas adopted in 1992, governs negotiable instruments such as checks. Although it is not directly applicable to this criminal case, it offers valuable, common-sense guidance on who qualifies as the "maker" of a check. A maker is a "person who signs or is identified in a note as a person undertaking to pay." K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 84-3-103(5). Under the UCC, Sweeney was the maker of the check. Ward was merely the alterer of that check.

 In short, the State failed to meet its burden to prove the first element of the crime of making false information.

Because the evidence did not support either conviction, they were reversed.