Involuntary statements

Pantaleon Florez, Jr. won in State v. Karin Morton, No. 97,848 (Kan. July 3, 2008), affirming Judge James Smith's suppression of statements in a Franklin County making a false information prosecution. The KSC affirmed the COA's holding that Ms. Morton was not in custody and therefore there was no Miranda violation. But the KSC went on to analyze what the COA didn't, whether the statements were voluntary:

The agent's undisclosed purpose for the interview, Morton's subjective beliefs about the civil nature of the interview, and the agent's comment about the need for an attorney are not relevant to the issue of whether Morton was "in custody" for purposes of Miranda. These circumstances may nevertheless be relevant to a claim that her statements were inadmissible under the due process voluntariness standard. In this case, it appears the district court determined that the agent's conduct was fundamentally unfair and, thus, Morton's statements were not voluntary.

. . . .

In this case, the district court found the agent's conduct to be unfair because, while Morton believed the criminal investigation had ended with no charges to be filed, the purpose of the agent's interview was to further the criminal investigation and encourage the filing of charges by providing additional information to the county attorney. Additionally, Morton argues that the agent's comment that she did not need an attorney because it was not that kind of interview was fundamentally unfair. Consequently, the issue concerns the extent to which the officer's conduct was unfair and, thus, rendered Morton's statements involuntary.

We have held that false statements to a suspect about the strength of the evidence do not, by themselves, render the suspect's confession involuntary. Rather, they must be viewed in conjunction with the totality of the circumstances surrounding the confession to determine whether it was voluntarily made.

While telling a suspect false information about the evidence against the suspect, standing alone, does not render a confession involuntary, giving the suspect false or misleading information about the law is more problematic.

. . . .

[The agent], however, did not tell Morton she had no right to have an attorney present, he told her she did not need an attorney. In asking the agent whether she needed a lawyer present, Morton was clearly trying to determine whether the interview was part of the criminal investigation. Of course, the agent knew it was. We note that, as a government agent for an agency with both civil and criminal investigative power, the criminal investigatory purpose of the agent's interview was not obvious in the way an interview conducted by police officers and detectives is. Under these circumstances, we conclude the agent's response to Morton's question was an affirmative misrepresentation about the true nature of the interview.

. . . .

All other aspects of the circumstances surrounding this interview indicate that Morton's statements were voluntarily made. She was a 40-year-old, college-educated woman who had been involved in a criminal investigation in this very matter. There was nothing coercive about the manner and duration of the interview, and there is no evidence she was deprived of contact with the outside world during the interview. In fact, she was explicitly told she did not have to answer any questions, she could stop the interview at any time, and she was free to leave at any time. However, Morton had an attorney who had represented her during this criminal investigation concerning the trailers and it was her intent and desire to have the benefit of the advice and presence of counsel in this criminal investigation. Had she known [the agent] was conducting a criminal investigation, she would not have agreed to the interview without the advice and presence of counsel. We consider this in conjunction with the facts that Morton believed the criminal investigation had ended and the agent's status as a criminal investigator was not patently apparent. Under these circumstances, by reason of the agent's conduct, Morton's participation in the interview and the statements given therein were not the product of her free and independent will. Accordingly, Morton's statements were involuntary and, thus, inadmissible.

So when officers step over the line and mislead suspects regarding the law, that's too far, even when there are a lot of other facts that would support a voluntariness finding. [Of course, I think misleading on evidence should be just as problematic--why should law enforcement be the only people who have a license to defraud?]

[Update: the state filed a petition for writ of certiorari on September 26, 2008. Here is the SCOTUS docket.]

[Further update: apparently, Ms. Morton filed her own pro se brief in opposition to the state's petition. Although a Topeka law firm was listed as counsel for a brief period, she is listed on the brief pro se and the law firm is no longer listed on the court docket. The case is set on the SCOTUS docket for January 9, 2008.]

[Further update: the SCOTUS denied the state's petition on January 12, 2009.]