Reversal based on improper shackling before jury

Washburn student intern Patrick Turner and I won in State v. Anderson, No. 96,602 (Kan. App. Sept. 26, 2008), remanding a Cloud County criminal threat prosecution for a new trial. The only issue addressed in the opinion was the district court's refusal to allow Mr. Anderson to appear at his jury trial without leg shackles. Just prior to trial, defense counsel asked that they be removed. The district court said that the deputy wanted them on, so they should stay on. Defense counsel clarified that the district court was not finding that Mr. Anderson was a flight risk or that he had been disruptive, the district court's order was just based on the deputy's policy.

That made a pretty easy decision for the COA:

Here, it is impossible to review this case using the abuse of discretion standard since the district court failed to exercise its discretion. It simply deferred to the wishes of the jailer. The nature of judicial discretion was discussed in State v. Foren, 78 Kan. 654, 658-59, 97 P. 791 (1908): "Discretion is the freedom to act according to one's judgment; and judicial discretion implies the liberty to act as a judge should act, applying the rules and analogies of the law to the facts found after weighing and examining the evidence–to act upon fair judicial consideration, and not arbitrarily."

Rather than exercising judicial discretion in considering Anderson's request that the shackles be removed, the district court deferred to the jailer and let him decide. The jailer's decision became the court's decision, without analysis or application of the principles of law to the facts presented. As such, the district court clearly abused its discretion.

The State acknowledges that the shackles were apparent to the jurors deciding Anderson's innocence or guilt. Anderson was charged with criminal threat, that is, that he threatened violence with the intent to terrorize others. The presence of shackles clearly sent the message to the jury that here is a violent and dangerous man. The discretion to shackle Anderson throughout the trial was exercised without any proper analysis to support it. Under these circumstances, the use of shackles was inherently prejudicial.

I guess that's why district judges get paid the big bucks--to make decisions.

[Update: the state did not file a PR and the mandate issued on October 30, 2008.]