Because a culpable mental state is required unless the definition of an offense plainly dispenses with that requirement or clearly indicates a legislative purpose to impose absolute liability and K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 8-1602 lacks both these indicators, it is clear that criminal intent must be an element of that offense. As provided by the criminal intent statutes, if a crime lacks a prescribed culpable mental state, "'intent,' 'knowledge' or 'recklessness' suffices to establish criminal responsibility." K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 21-5202(e). The State therefore needed to plead and prove that Heironimus intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly left the scene of an injury accident in violation of the requirements of K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 8-1602(a).The COA went on to consider whether omission of the general intent requirement was harmless, but under the evidence presented concluded that "it is possible that a jury properly instructed on all elements could have found that Heironimus lacked the required mental element and acquitted him." As a result, the COA reversed and remanded that count for a new trial.
[Update: the state did not file a PR and the mandate issued on September 24, 2015.]