Friday, June 20, 2008

Juveniles have right to a jury trial

Paul Shipp won in In re L.M., No. 96,197 (Kan. June 20, 2008), reversing a Finney County juvenile prosecution and overruling Findlay v. State, 235 Kan. 462, 681 P.2d 20 (1984), the twenty-four year old precedent holding that juveniles are not entitled to a jury trial. The KSC acknowledged that SCOTUS precedent has held otherwise, but noted that the Kansas Legislature has substiantially abandoned the rehabilitative purpose of the juvenile system underlying that decision:

These changes to the juvenile justice system have eroded the benevolent parens patriae character that distinguished it from the adult criminal system. The United States Supreme Court relied on the juvenile justice system's characteristics of fairness, concern, sympathy, and paternal attention in concluding that juveniles were not entitled to a jury trial. [McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 550 (1971)]. Likewise, this court relied on that parens patriae character in reaching its decision in Findlay. However, because the juvenile justice system is now patterned after the adult criminal system, we conclude that the changes have superseded the McKeiver and Findlay Courts' reasoning and those decisions are no longer binding precedent for us to follow. Based on our conclusion that the Kansas juvenile justice system has become more akin to an adult criminal prosecution, we hold that juveniles have a constitutional right to a jury trial under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. As a result, K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 38-2344(d), which provides that a juvenile who pleads not guilty is entitled to a "trial to the court," and K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 38-2357, which gives the district court discretion in determining whether a juvenile should be granted a jury trial, are unconstitutional.

In reaching this conclusion, we are mindful of decisions in other jurisdictions rejecting the argument that changes to the juvenile justice system have altered its parens patriae character.
We are also mindful that many of the state courts that have addressed this issue in one form or another have declined to extend the constitutional right to a jury trial to juveniles.
While there is wide variability in the juvenile offender laws throughout the country, it nevertheless seems apparent to us that the KJJC, in its tilt towards applying adult standards of criminal procedure and sentencing, removed the paternalistic protections previously accorded juveniles while continuing to deny those juveniles the constitutional right to a jury trial. Although we do not find total support from the courts in some of our sister states, we are undaunted in our belief that juveniles are entitled to the right to a jury trial guaranteed to all citizens under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
The majority went on to also hold that the right to jury trial attaches under section 10 of the Kansas Constitution:

The KJJC repeatedly refers to its proceedings as a prosecution. See K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 38-2303(c), (d); K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 38-2304(e)(2); K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 38-2346(a), (b)(1); K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 38-2350; K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 38-2381. In addition, proceedings under the KJJC are based on allegations that juveniles have violated the criminal laws of this State. Because the KJJC has lost the parens patriae character of the former KJOC and has transformed into a system for prosecuting juveniles charged with committing crimes, we conclude that the proceedings under the KJJC fit within the meaning of the phrase "all prosecutions" as set forth in §10, and juveniles have a right to a jury trial under the Kansas Constitution. Consequently, K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 38-2344(d) and K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 38-2357 are also unconstitutional under the Kansas Constitution.
The majority holds that this decision is only to be prospectively.

Here is coverage from the Topeka Capital-J0urnal. Here is coverage in the Wichita Eagle. Here is coverage in the Hutchinson News. Here is coverage in the Lawrence Journal-World. Here is coverage in the Kansas City Star. Here is coverage on KCTV5. Here is coverage on What the Judge Ate for Breakfast. And the story hit the national wire. Here is coverage in the Washington Times for example. And the national blogs. Here is coverage on How Appealing. And here and here is coverage on Sentencing Law and Policy.

This is obviously a big decision in juvenile circles. I know Paul has been working on this issue for a long time and it is a great victory. Any juvenile defendant (whose case is not final) unsatisfied with a trial court guilt adjudicaton should cite this opinion.

Does this decision have any impact in criminal cases? I guess my first thought was whether it has any impact on State v. LaMunyon, 259 Kan. 54, 911 P.2d 151 (1996). Prior to 1996, K.S.A. 38-1601 stated that “In no case shall any order, judgment or decree of the district court, in any proceedings under the provisions of [the Juvenile Code], be deemed or held to import a criminal act on the part of any juvenile....” We argued that the recently passed Sentencing Guidelines Act, which included juvenile adjudications in criminal history violated this statute. The KSC said that the "fallacy with this argument is that the defendant equates the term 'criminal act' or 'criminal conviction' with 'criminal history.' It is well established that a juvenile adjudication is not a 'criminal conviction.'” The KSC also rejected a claim that juvenile adjudications could not be used because the juvenile proceedings did not include a right to a jury trial.

The L.M. Court's conclusion is just the opposite of LaMunyon. The KSC has finally acknowledged that, at least since 1996, Kansas has definitely attached different consequences and has different policy goals in the juvenile justice system and those differences transform juvenile adjudications in a meaningful way. If you had a criminal history score that included juvenile adjudications from before January 1, 1997, I think I would object based on K.S.A. 38-1601 as it applied before 1996 and as the juvenile system is interpreted by L.M.

Maybe L.M. has a more general impact on juvenile adjudications? Although the KSC attempts to say that this decision can only be applied prosectively, the reality is that the legislative changes that transformed juvenile adjudications into criminal prosecutions date from 1996. If the state seeks to use any juvenile adjudications in criminal history, I suppose you could argue they were unconstitutionally obtained and should not be included in criminal history.

Any other ideas about the import of L.M.? Please comment.

[Update: the state filed a motion for reheaing on July7, 2008].

[Further update: the KSC denied the state's motion for rehearing on September 22, 2008.]

[Further update: here is a January 2009 Hutchinson News article reporting that courts have not been overburdened by this ruling.]

1 comment:

Unknown said...

Prior to even reading the opinion, my very first question was - do we get prelims and jury trials in misd?

After reading the opinion, that did not answer my initial questions, my next question is following their analysis do we get jury trials in municipal courts?

"So long, therefore, as the fundamental law contains the guaranty which it does, I think no party can be subjected to a prosecution for an act of a criminal nature, whether that prosecution be brought by the state directly or any corporation created by the state, without in some way and before some tribunal being secured an opportunity of having the truth of that charge inquired into by an impartial jury of the district. Does this change the bench trial, appeal, jury trial format.

As you raised about using juvenile conviction in sentencings, does it also have an impact on those nasty litle misdemeanors from muncipal courts.

This is going to be fun...you know how I like to stretch those rubber bands.